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Essays
Neuroethics and ELSI: Similarities and Differences
Henry T. Greely*
In the last four years “neuroethics” has become a term to
describe the study of the ethical, legal, and social implications
of new technologies from neuroscience. That field is strongly
influenced by its predecessor, “ELSI,” the ethical, legal, and
social implications of genetics. Both areas are the result of
ongoing revolutions in scientific knowledge directly relevant to
human life, both concern technologies that will have
substantial effects on human societies, and both discuss
possibilities that scare many people. Yet there is reason to
think that neuroethics will expand in directions and develop in
ways that are often significantly different from ELSI.
This article attempts to map some of the similarities and
differences between these two fields. It first briefly reviews the
history of both endeavors. It then describes ways in which the
substantive questions explored by neuroethics are likely both to
parallel and to diverge from those analyzed by ELSI. It ends
by discussing the path forward for neuroethics and how its
future will both be influenced by, but will differ from, that of
ELSI.
I. HISTORIES
A. ELSI
ELSI has two connected meanings.1 It is a field of study
© 2006 Henry T. Greely.
* Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law, Professor, by
courtesy, of Genetics, Stanford University. The author would like to thank his
research assistant, Jason Tarricone.
1. For people of a certain age, it also calls to mind “Elsie the Contented
Cow” from advertisements for Borden’s Dairy Products. Elsie, introduced in
1939, was named by Advertising Age as one of the ten top advertising icons of
the twentieth century. See AdAge.com, Top 10 Advertising Icons of the
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but it is also a set of structures, including prominently two
federal programs that have provided an unprecedented amount
of funding for studying the ethical implications of a new
technology.
People have been worrying about the implications of
genetic technologies for decades. By the mid-1970s, scholars
were publishing volumes of conference proceedings about
genetics and the law;2 by the early 1980s, a presidential
commission issued two different reports on the implications of
genetic engineering and humans3 and on genetic testing.4 The
term “ethical, legal, and social implications” (or “issues”) seems
to have first appeared in print (or at least in the Nexis
database) with respect to genetics in 1990;5 the acronym ELSI
Century, http://adage.com/century/ad_icons.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS
AND THE LAW (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1976); NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS AND THE LAW II (Aubrey
Milunsky & George J. Annas, eds., 1980) (proceedings of a national
symposium on genetics and law held in May 1980); NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS AND THE LAW III (Aubrey Milunsky & George
J. Annas, eds., 1985) (proceedings of a national symposium on genetics and
law held in May 1984).
3. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED.
& BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS
(1982).
4. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND
COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL,
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND
EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1983).
5. See David Kramer, Paper Describes DOE/NIH Genome Project, but
Avoids Money Question, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS (Platts, New
York, N.Y.), May 14, 1990, at 6 (describing the first NIH-DOE five year plan
for the Human Genome Project). The second use was in the main stream
media, when the New York Times referred to Dr. Nancy Wexler as the head of
the working group on ethical, legal and social issues. See Sandra Blakeslee,
Ethicists See Omens of an Era of Genetic Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at
B9. Interestingly, the phrase does turn up earlier in Nexis in connection with
the implications of other biomedical technologies. A 1983 article in Science
about in vitro fertilization refers to its “ethical, legal, and social consequences.”
Clifford Grobstein et al., External Human Fertilization: An Evaluation of
Policy, 222 SCIENCE 127, 129 (1983). The phrase appeared in two newspaper
articles from Australia, one about HIV policy, Events of Interest Tonight,
ADVERTISER, Aug. 8, 1986 (“medical, ethical, legal and social implications”),
and one that described a government committee, the National Bioethics
Consultative Committee, then newly-appointed to study advances in medical
technologies more generally. Philip Heyward, New Group Seeks Consensus
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followed in 1991.6 This “acronym as noun” caught on, at least
in the most directly relevant areas of bioethics and genetics,
seeing off an early challenge from “genethics.”7
Where Controversy Rages, HOBART MERCURY, May 18, 1988 (“ethical, legal,
and social issues”). I suspect its American usage stemmed more directly from
the fairly broad coverage of the term in Canada in 1989 when the government,
in the “Speech from the Throne” laying out its program for the year, called for
creation of a royal commission to inquire into new reproductive technologies,
citing “concern that these scientific advances will outpace our ability to deal
with their moral, ethical, legal and social implications.” Governor-General
Jeanne Sauve, Speech from the Throne Touches on Wide Range of Issues,
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 4, 1989, at A20. In Canada the word “moral” stuck and
for some years the Canadians talked about “MELSI.” It is interesting to
speculate why the NIH-DOE working group adopted everything except “moral”
from the Canadian phrase. I suspect it was to avoid religious connotations
associated with “moral”: “ethical” seems more secular. In any event, the
Canadians seem to have replaced MELSI more recently with GELS, which
stands for “genomics ethical, legal, and social issues” or, much worse, by
GE3LS, for “genomics ethics, environmental, economic, legal, and social
issues.” Of course, the 1983 report on genetic testing by the President’s
Commission almost used the term in its title, which referred to “ethical, social,
and legal implications.” ESLI, however, would not have been as euphonious
an acronym as ELSI.
6. “Three percent of the total budget, or an estimated $ 90 million over
15 years, will be used to study ‘ELSI’ — ethical, legal and social issues.” Judy
Foreman, Working Out the Genome Project Ethics – In Advance, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1991, at 25.
7. “Genethics” first appears in the Nexis database in 1983, in quotations,
as a term used by then-representative Al Gore: “In a statement . . . Gore said
that the new genetic technologies created a complex set of ethical questions—
which he called ‘genethics.’” Michael Schrage, Clergy Hit for Stance on Genes,
WASH. POST June 23, 1983, at C10. (The number of publications included in
Nexis was quite small in the early 1980s and the database has very limited
coverage before 1980; it cannot be relied upon to find the first use of a term
from that era, but it is some evidence of the amount of its use.) The term
appears seven more times in the 1980s, six of them in references, usually in
reviews, to a book with that word in its title: DAVID SUZUKI & PETER
KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS AND
HUMAN VALUES (1989). One of the book reviews notes the creation at about
that same time of a European coalition called the “Genethic Network,” which
seems to have come and gone quickly. See Liebe F. Cavalieri, Ethics in the
Brave New World, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1989 (Book World), at 9. From 1990
through 1994, genethics appeared fifteen times (six of them about a biotech
company with that name) compared with twenty-six mentions for ELSI; by
2000 through 2004, the numbers were 101 uses of genethics to 157 for ELSI.
Most of the “genethics” uses referred to either an Australian “GenEthics
network” or a “genethics competition” in Australian schools; several of them,
though, were from various reprintings of a column by William Safire. (The
“ELSI” search was for “ELSI and genetics” as “ELSI” by itself picks up both a
company whose stock exchange symbol was ELSI and a surprising number of
women named Elsi.) “Genethics” is a more transparent term, with a more
obvious meaning, than ELSI. I suspect it lost out in part because it was too
similar to “genetics”; this both made the spoken term confusing and, perhaps
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But “ELSI” as an activity can probably be dated to
September 26, 1988, when it took its first step toward being not
just an area of scholarly activity but a well-funded government
program (or two). That day, Dr. James Watson was introduced
as the first director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Office of Genome Research (which became the National Center
for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) in 1990), a newly
established unit of the NIH.8 The NIH was to share the work,
and the funding, of deciphering the entire human genome with
the Department of Energy (DOE), with NIH receiving roughly
two-thirds and DOE roughly one-third of the funding. (The
NIH share eventually grew to about eighty percent.) Watson,
however, was to have oversight of sorts over both parts of the
Project. He immediately made a commitment to what became
ELSI:
At the press conference to announce his appointment, Watson
declared that the ethical and social implications of genome research
warranted a special effort and should be funded directly by NIH. . . .
Remaining in character, he made the public commitment before
conferring with Wyngaarden [the Director of NIH] or anyone else at
NIH.9

Watson ultimately proclaimed that the Human Genome Project
would devote three to five percent of its funding to studying the
ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic technologies.
It has never been clear to what extent Watson’s pledge was
motivated by his political assessment that the Project would be
more likely to be funded with that commitment and to what
extent it came from his own belief that the ethical issues were
genuinely important. Watson has not said and, given his
personality and history of frequent provocative comments, it is
not clear how much credibility to accord whatever he might say
about his motivations. The view of Robert Cook-Deegan, the
historian of the early years of the Human Genome Project and
a participant in its building, is that “[i]f there was a protective
motive for Watson’s support [of ELSI], there was also a longmore importantly, made it seem “too cute.” “Neuroethics” is not nearly as
close in sound to its scientific parent, “neuroscience.”
8. See Larry Thompson, Gene Pioneer Will Head Mapping Project, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 1988 (Health), at 7.
9. ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND
THE HUMAN GENOME 163 (1994). Interestingly, as far as I can tell none of the
immediate news reports of Watson’s appointment mentioned his financial
commitment to ethics research.
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standing interest.”10
Whatever his reasons, his pledge got results. In 1990 both
the NCHGR and the DOE created programs on the ethical,
The NIH
legal, and social implications of genetics.11
established “the ELSI Branch” in its Division of Extramural
Research and the DOE established its own ELSI Program in its
Office of Energy Research. The NIH program concentrated on
funding external grants, mainly to academics for conferences,
working groups, articles, and books. More of the DOE funding
was spent internally, largely at national laboratories that were
part of the legacy of the Manhattan Project and the Atomic
Energy Commission, including Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, and Oak Ridge.
From
September 1989 to 1997, the two efforts were loosely
coordinated by the National Institutes of Health-Department of
Energy Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications of Human Genetics Research (ELSI Working
Group). The ELSI Working Group was abolished in 1997, but
the separate NIH and DOE programs continued.
Watson resigned as director of NCHGR in 1992 after a
dispute with Bernadine Healy, then director of NIH, over NIH
policies concerning gene patents. He was succeeded in 1993 by
Francis Collins, a pediatrician and geneticist who had helped
lead the team that in 1989 isolated the gene responsible, when
mutated, for cystic fibrosis. Collins remains director of the
organization, which in 1997 was promoted to the status of a full
institute at the NIH, the National Institute for Human Genome
Research. Under Collins, the ELSI program has continued to
be very active under several different NIH directors. After
Watson, the program has shown more interest in policy
analysis and, recently, in creating Centers of Excellence in
Ethics Research around the country.12 The DOE ELSI program
10. Id. at 248.
11. This brief history is derived largely from three sources (as well as
personal experience). See National Human Genome Research Inst., The
Planning and Evaluation History of the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications
(ELSI)
Research
Program
[hereinafter
ELSI
History],
http://www.genome.gov/10001754 (last visited Mar. 29, 2006); COOK-DEEGAN,
supra note 9; Kathi E. Hanna, The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
Programs of the National Center for Human Genome Research: A Missed
Opportunity?, in COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL & ETHICAL IMPACTS OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOMEDICINE, INST. OF MED., SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL
AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 432 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al.
eds., 1995).
12. Glenn McGee has written an interesting analysis of the change in
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also continues and has had remarkably stable leadership under
Dr. Daniel Drell from June 1991 to the present. The DOE
ELSI program has limited its focus to education about genetics,
the privacy of genetic information, and employment
consequences of genetics.
The Human Genome Projects at both NIH and DOE have
consistently spent about three to five percent of their budgets
on ELSI activities. The two agencies boast that they are
running the largest bioethics project in the world. Over the
last fifteen years, they have spent more than $150 million,
leading to hundreds of articles, books, conferences, and other
research and educational activities on the ethical, legal, and
social implications of genetics. Scholarship on these issues has
proceeded in the United States without government funding,
or, for some kinds of research—such as much legal research—
without any funding at all, but the ELSI programs have
certainly meant that more such research has been done and
more researchers have been lured into the field. It is hard to
know how to assess whether the financial investment in ELSI
has been worthwhile; it is noteworthy, though, that since the
American part of the Human Genome Project was created—
with active ELSI programs from the beginning—public
controversies about human genetics have not seriously
threatened the Project’s funding.
The Human Genome Project, of course, was not solely an
American endeavor. It was pursued by researchers, and paid
for by funds, from many countries, notably the United
Kingdom, Japan, and France. Some ELSI work was supported
by other countries, either individually or through regional
organizations like the European Union. Canada, for example,
has had an active program in “GE3LS” (Genomics Ethics,
Environmental, Economic, Legal, and Social Issues), which has
received substantial funding and has created a significant
cadre of Canadian researchers expert in the area.
Genetics researchers from around the world created a
voluntary association called the Human Genome Organisation
ELSI as a result of the Centers of Excellence in Ethics Research, arguing that
Collins has, in effect, created publicly-financed ELSI think tanks, to the
detriment of ELSI researchers not associated with those centers. Glenn
McGee, “Nanoethics”: The ELSI of 21st Century Bioethics?, THE EDITORS BLOG
OF
THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS,
Jan.
29,
2006,
http://blog.bioethics.net/2006/01/nanoethics-elsi-of-21st-century.html.
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(HUGO) in 1988 with the hope of using it to help coordinate the
worldwide project. HUGO never did play the substantial role it
initially envisioned, as international coordination seems to
have occurred mainly as a result of talks directly between the
agencies of the nations providing most of the funding and the
researchers they funded. In 1992, HUGO created its own
ethics group, initially called the Ethical, Legal, and Social
Issues Committee, with very broad international membership.
This HUGO committee, now called simply the HUGO Ethics
Committee, has not funded research by others, as HUGO itself
has been consistently financially strapped. It has, however,
issued a number of useful and widely discussed policy
statements, particularly under the leadership of Canadian law
professor Bartha Maria Knoppers from 1996 to 2004.13
A few legal academics, such as George Annas and
Alexander Capron, took part in some of the earliest discussions
of ELSI issues. Initially these issues were dealt with in law
schools, if at all, in “law and science” courses or a rare
specialized seminar. Since the growth of ELSI, many more
legal academics have become involved in research that involves
genetics, and law schools are seeing more seminars or even
courses on “law and genetics.” At this point, probably more
than fifty active American law professors have published at
least once on ELSI-related issues. Although this is a small
fraction of the roughly 6,000 full-time American law professors,
it is a significant number.
B. NEUROETHICS
The term “neuroethics” arguably was coined, and surely
was popularized, by New York Times columnist (and
wordsmith) William Safire.14 Safire chairs the board of the
Dana Foundation, a private philanthropic organization with a
special interest in mental health, neurological diseases, and
neuroscience. He seems to have first used in the term in print,
albeit with a hyphen, in a July 2001 column about human
embryonic stem cell research, saying, in passing, “Disclosure:
13. See Hugo Genome Organisation Ethics Committee, Policy Statements,
http://www.hugo-international.org/committee_ethics_info.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006) (giving an incomplete list of the policy statements).
14. Research by Paul Root Wolpe has shown that the term had been used
on several occasions before Safire, but in specialized publications, with
somewhat different meanings, and without any apparent notice being taken of
it.

GREELY_FINAL_UPDATED

606

6/7/2006 6:34:17 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 7:2

When not vituperating for a living, I head a foundation that
supports research in brain science, neuro-immunology and
immuno-imaging. We’re exploring studies in neuro-ethics,
surely a growing field.”15 He returned to the now-hyphenless
term more centrally in May 2002, devoting half a column to
“the world of worry about unbridled science called ‘neuroethics’
[which] . . . deals with the benefits and dangers of treating and
manipulating our minds.”16
Personally, I find “neuroethics” less than ideal as a
description for this field. It focuses entirely on “ethics” and
ignores the legal and social issues that may be quite important.
On the other hand, the term is catchy. Once applied, it has
been impossible to dislodge—particularly as the broader
alternatives, like “ethical, legal, and social issues in
neuroscience” (ELSIN) or “neuroscience ethical, legal, and
social implications” (NELSI), are hopelessly clunky by
comparison.
Similar to ELSI, neuroethics has a “pre-history,” a long
period during which scholars and others worried about the
possible implications of neuroscience—defined broadly—and
society. It is little remembered today, but Huxley’s novel Brave
New World was more about psychological conditioning, sleep
learning, and the effects of prenatal exposure to alcohol or
oxygen on cognitive traits than it was about genetics.17
Philosophers, in particular, have a long history of interest in
the mind, some of which spilled into neuroscience, with
particular interest in issues of free will and personal
responsibility.
In 1984, the late, lamented Office of Technology
Assessment issued a thirty-six page background paper on the
social implications of neuroscience,18 but the federal
government did not follow it up. On July 25, 1989, Congress
passed House Joint Resolution 174, declaring the 1990s “the
15. William Safire, Stem Cell Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A17.
(The same language showed up without the hyphen in the version of the
column published a few days later. William Safire, Time To Move Ahead,
Boldly, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 9, 2001, at A9.)
16. William Safire, The But-What-If Factor, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at
A25.
17. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper & Row 1969)
(1932).
18. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPACTS OF
NEUROSCIENCE—A BACKGROUND PAPER (1984).
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Decade of the Brain,”19 followed by a presidential proclamation
of the same in June 1990.20 Although this announcement came
at the same time as the development of ELSI inside NIH and
DOE, no neuroethics movement resulted, nor, it appears, was
one even contemplated. (Cook-Deegan does report, however,
that other institutes of NIH watched the ELSI experiment at
NCHGR very closely; it is possible that the National Institute
for Mental Health (NIMH) or the National Institute for
Neurological Disease and Stroke (NINDS) were among them.)21
The world of neuroscience had shown some previous
interest in ethical and social issues. Since 1972, the Society for
Neuroscience, one of the largest scientific societies in the world
—its annual conference regularly draws around 30,000
participants—has had a Committee on Social Issues
(sometimes called the Committee on Social Responsibility).
Since 1983, this committee has sponsored a Social Issues
Roundtable at the annual convention, including both panel
discussions and occasional plenary talks.
To date, neuroscience has caught the attention of very few
legal academics. Before 2000, only four law review articles
appear in Lexis with the words “neuroscience” or
“neuroimaging” in their titles.22 Only two more have appeared
since then. The few legal academics interested in the brain (or
the mind) were scattered into two very different fields—law
and psychology and mental health law—which focused more on
the rights of those facing possible commitment for mental
illness. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS)
publishes an annual directory of law faculty in which those
faculty can choose to list themselves as working in various
specialties. The number of faculty identifying themselves as
working in Law and Psychology peaked at 128 in the 1995-1996

19. See H.R.J. Res. 174, 101st Cong. (1989) (stating “the President of the
United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling
upon all public officials and the people of the United States to observe such
decade with appropriate programs and activities”).
20. Proclamation No. 6158, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (July 20, 1990).
21. COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 9, at 241.
22. One was a Note by my then-student, Dr. Jennifer Kulynych, which,
when published in 1997, should have, but did not, spark my interest in the
field. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A HighTech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1997).
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academic year and is now down to roughly 116.23
“Neuroscience” has never been listed as a specialty in the AALS
directory and does not seem to have been the subject of any
courses.
In general, there has been surprisingly little discussion of
the ethical, social, and legal issues raised by advances in
neuroscience.24 What might be called, possibly with some
hyperbole, the “modern era” in neuroethics almost certainly
dates to 2002. The key event was probably a conference held in
San Francisco in May 2002, entitled “Neuroscience: Mapping
The conference was co-hosted by Stanford
the Field.”25
University and the University of California-San Francisco
(UCSF) and was funded by the Dana Foundation. The main
organizers were Dr. Zach Hall, then Associate Chancellor at
UCSF and now the President of the California Institute of
Regenerative Medicine; Dr. Judy Illes of Stanford; and Dr.
Barbara Koenig of Stanford, now at the Mayo Medical School.
The conference brought together more than twenty speakers
and an audience of over 150. Its main themes were the
implications of neuroscience for individuals, for social policy,
and for clinical neuroscience, as well as issues associated with
the dissemination of neuroscience discoveries.26 Its speakers
23. ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 200506 (2006); ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
1995-96 (1996).
24. One notable exception is a book written by a political scientist.
ROBERT H. BLANK, BRAIN POLICY: HOW THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE WILL
CHANGE OUR LIVES AND OUR POLITICS (1999). This book contains chapters on
a wide range of topics, including genetics and the brain, brain and behavior,
intervening in the brain, brain grafting, and neurotoxicity. It does not,
however, discuss imaging technologies in any depth, and Blank, now at Brunel
University in the United Kingdom, does not seem to have published more on
these issues. He has not been involved in more recent discussions of
neuroethics.
25. Two other conferences in 2002 are worthy of note. On February 7,
2002, the University of Pennsylvania held a conference entitled “Ethics and
the Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution.” It was smaller than the San
Francisco conference, less broad in its coverage of neuroethics, and it produced
no written output, but an argument could be made for its priority. In March
2002, Michael Gazzaniga, a cognitive neuroscientist at Dartmouth who had
recently been named a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, hosted
a fifteen-speaker workshop in London on “Neuroscience in 2025.” This may
not have had broad effects on the field, but it did mark my introduction to it,
as Gazzaniga invited me to give the only talk at the workshop on ethical and
legal issues.
26. My own contribution to the discussion included a much shorter and
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included many, if not most, of those who have subsequently
been viewed as working in neuroethics. The Dana Press,
operated by the Dana Foundation, produced a useful volume of
proceedings of the conference, called Neuroethics: Mapping the
Field. 27
The period since 2002 has seen an increasing number of
conferences, workshops, and publications dealing expressly
with neuroethics. One notable workshop was held jointly by
the Dana Foundation and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science in September 2003, entitled
“Neuroscience and the Law.”
It brought together
neuroscientists, law professors, judges, and practitioners and
resulted in a book, again published by Dana Press, called
Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of
Justice.28 In 2005, the American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities, the leading bioethics society in the United States,
established a “neuroethics affinity group” and plans are under
way for the formation of some kind of “neuroethics society.”
And 2006 has seen the publication of Neuroethics: Defining the
Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy, a book edited by Judy
Illes with contributions from many of the researchers active in
neuroethics.29
Unlike ELSI, there has been little governmental support
for neuroethics. The main conferences were sponsored by
private funding, especially from the Dana Foundation. Thus
far, neither NIMH nor NINDS, two major sources of federal
funding on neuroscience, have shown any interest in a general
neuroethics program. The NIH has funded a few individual
research projects, such as an RO1 project awarded to Illes.
Other parts of the federal government have funded some efforts
that have implications in the area. The National Institute for
Justice, in the Justice Department, funded Michael
Gazzaniga’s 2002 workshop in London; the National Science
Foundation and the Office of the Science and Technology
Policy, pursuant to specific congressional authorization, have
simpler approach to the question of this article. See Henry T. Greely,
Neuroethics and ELSI: Some Comparisons and Considerations, in
NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD 83, 83-94 (Steven J. Markus ed., 2002)
(outlining views on the likely legal, ethical, and social implications of
neuroscience).
27. NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD (Steven J. Marcus ed., 2002).
28. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland ed., 2004).
29. NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY (Judy Illes ed., 2005).
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hosted a series of workshops on the use of neuroscience to
improve lie detection, which have included some discussion of
legal and ethical issues.
II. ISSUES
We now have over fifteen years of ELSI programs and a
longer time of ELSI research. New issues continue to emerge,
as well as new interpretations of (and even evidence about)
older issues, but the broad outlines of the field seem fairly
clear. Neuroethics is much newer, and its contents and borders
are more obscure. Nonetheless, it seems useful to look at the
issues explored by ELSI and being examined by neuroethics to
see where, and how, the newer field is likely to build on the
older—and where it will not. This section of the article starts
with overviews of both fields and then analyzes first areas of
similarity and then areas of divergence.
Before starting, two major differences between these first
need to be noted. First, genetics studies characteristics that
pass, strongly or weakly, from one generation to another.
Neuroscience looks at characteristics of individuals (and their
brains) that, except for any genetic roots they have, are no
more likely to pass from one generation to another than any
other trait that is influenced by environment, which, of course,
includes the family as one key part. Second, neuroscience is
likely, in many cases, to be more powerful than genetics,
especially for issues of behavior. The genetic variations that a
person is born with will sometimes influence his later behavior,
but that influence will necessarily be mediated by years of both
experience and chance. The size, shape, health, architecture,
and patterns of neuronal activity that exist at any given time in
a person’s brain should be much more strongly connected to
that person’s behavior. They should, in fact, determine it.
These two differences will explain much, though not all, of the
differences in what issues ELSI and neuroethics examine—and
how they approach them.
A. OVERVIEWS OF THE FIELDS
One can, of course, carve up the work in ELSI in many
different ways. All of it proceeds from the revolution in
genetics sparked by our understanding of DNA and our
consequent ability to “read” the genetic code. The substantive
research in genetics over the past thirty years has been
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extraordinary and is, at least in its general outlines, well
known. I will not discuss the science, but will focus on the
research and its implications. I have found it useful to think
about six major themes in the ethical, legal, and social
implications of genetics: identity, uncovering the past,
revealing the future, manipulation of genes and genomes,
ownership and control, and effects on culture.30
Identity issues include, prominently, the forensic uses of
DNA but also the possible use of DNA for establishing “ethnic
identity” and the controversy over human reproductive cloning,
a form of assisted reproduction of particular interest only
because of the almost complete genetic identity between the
cloned and the clone. Genetics can uncover the past in ways
ranging from the history of the human species and its
migrations, to the genetic conditions of historic figures, to the
genealogies—or genetic parents—of individuals. The most
controversial area of human genetics is the use of DNA to
predict the future: the future of living individuals with genetic
variations linked to various diseases or traits, and the future of
fetuses or even, through the process called preimplantation
genetic diagnosis, embryos produced by in vitro fertilization.
The proper uses of such predictive technologies, and the
propriety of various users, such as insurers and employers or
parents and governments, has occupied most of the attention of
ELSI.
Manipulation of genes or genomes, through somatic cell
gene therapy, intentional inheritable genetic modification (also
known as germ-line gene therapy), or inter-specific genetic
chimeras (part-human or, more commonly, agricultural), has
also been widely discussed. Much ELSI research has focused
on issues around patents—on gene segments, on genes, and on
genetically modified organisms. Other significant issues of
ownership and control have included questions of personal
property, as in the famous Moore case,31 privacy, and forced
disclosure of genetic information. Perhaps the most important,
though not the most discussed, issues raised by the science of
30. See Henry T. Greely, Ethical Issues in the “New” Genetics, in 7
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
4762 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 3d ed. 2001); Henry T. Greely,
Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues in Human Genome Research, 27 ANN. REV.
OF ANTHROPOLOGY 473, 475 (1998); Henry T. Greely, The Revolution in
Human Genetics: Implications for Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REV. 377 (2001).
31. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
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genetics concern the broader effects of that science on human
cultures. On the one hand, this includes the effects on human
societies if the science of human genetics produces its hoped-for
payoff in reducing disease and extending life. It encompasses
our societies’ understandings of the relationships between
humans that are embodied in our concept of “race,” as well as
the family connections, clearly visible in DNA, with all of nonhuman life. Most profoundly, it speaks to the importance,
great or small, of genetics in our lives—genetic determinism
and, deeply still, genetic essentialism, the idea that, in some
meaningful sense, we are our genomes (circling around, in a
way, to the very first concern about identity).
As it reaches its fourth birthday, neuroethics is a rapidly
expanding area for research, as is the field of neuroscience on
which it depends. Neuroscience is in the early stages of a
revolution, brought about by improvements in tools in several
different areas. As this explosion of our understanding of the
human brain is not nearly as widely known as the revolution in
genetics, I will discuss some of its key features.
The most prominent changes have come from advances in
neuroimaging. Conventional x-rays were almost useless for
imaging living brains, both because of the enclosure of the
brain in the dense and x-ray opaque skull and the soft
consistency of brain tissue. Computerized axial tomography
(CAT scans) allowed some imaging of the brain, but the real
advances have come with a raft of other techniques, including
positron emission tomography (PET scans), single photon
emission tomography (SPECT scans), and, most notably,
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). All of these techniques can
provide computer files packed with data about the structure of
a brain, which can then be converted into visual
representations of various brain cross-sections.
PET and SPECT scans, along with a variation of MRI
called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), can show
activity within the brain by tracing the location or
concentration of various molecules, including glucose and deoxygenated hemoglobin. These technologies allow living brains
to be observed, both as their shape changes over time and as
they function, by watching the location and timing of glucose
and oxygen consumption. These functional capabilities are
allowing researchers to watch what areas of the brain are in
greater or lesser use as test subjects use their brains—for
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movement, for sensation, for emotion, or for thought. This has
led to published research on the sites, within the brain, of
passionate love,32 the sense of mystical union with God,33 and
the deepest level of Buddhist meditation,34 among many more
mundane examples.
Many other technologies are also contributing to the
neuroscience revolution. Electroencephalograms and other
methods of measuring electrical flows within the brain are
becoming more detailed and precise. Transcranial magnetic
stimulation is permitting an experimenter to make temporary
changes in the function of chosen brain tissues, stimulating or
repressing neuronal function. Implanted microelectrodes and
other devices are allowing the direct sensing and stimulation of
small numbers of, or even individual, brain neurons. New
drugs are providing new ways to heal, or to enhance, human
brains. And, of course, the neuroscience revolution is in part
the same as the genetics revolution. Our improved knowledge
of genes and their functions has included greatly increased
knowledge of genes that are important to the brain and how the
brain is affected by their normal and abnormal expression.
Huntington’s disease, fragile X syndrome, Tay-Sachs and
related diseases, and some cases of Alzheimer’s disease are the
subjects of both genetics and neuroscience and so have become
topics for both ELSI and neuroethics.
Stemming from advances in neuroscience, neuroethics
appears to be developing along three major lines. One branch
of neuroethics looks at ethical issues raised in the process of
neuroscience research. The work by Judy Illes and colleagues
on the serious problem of unexpectedly incidental findings
during neuroimaging is a good example of this strand.35 A
32. Andreas Bartels & Semir Zeki, The Neural Basis of Romantic Love, 11
NEUROREPORT 3829 (2000); H. Fisher, A. Aron & L.L. Brown, Romantic Love:
An fMRI Study of a Neural Mechanism for Mate Choice, 493 J. COMP.
NEUROLOGY 58 (2005).
33. Andrew Newberg et al., WHY GOD WON’T GO AWAY (2001) [hereinafter
Newberg et al., WHY]; A. Newberg et al., Cerebral Blood Flow During
Meditative Prayer: Preliminary Findings and Methodological Issues, 97
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 625 (2003) [hereinafter Newberg et al.,
Cerebral].
34. Newberg et al., WHY, supra note 33; Newberg et al., Cerebral, supra
note 33.
35. See Judy Illes et al., Ethical and Practical Considerations in
Managing Incidental Findings in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50
BRAIN & COGNITION 358 (2002) (discussing various ethical dilemmas arising
from brain imaging); Judy Illes et al., Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging
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second strand looks at the neuroscience of ethics—how human
brains make ethical decisions. There is substantial research in
this area as well as the broader area of how human brains
make decisions at all, which is sometimes called
neuroeconomics. Work by Oliver Goodenough and Kristin
Prehn on neuroimaging during normative decisions is a good
example of these kinds of research.36
The third strand of neuroethics, which is likely to be the
largest, looks at how existing or plausible discoveries and
technologies in neuroscience are likely to affect societies,
including their laws. This comprises at least four areas. The
first is the consequences of improved prediction of mental
illness, neurological disorders, or personality traits. A second
concerns the possibility of using neuroscience techniques to
determine a person’s competence. “Mind reading” is the third,
which is plausible through the use of neuroimaging and similar
technologies to associate detectable forms of brain activity with
mental states, such as lying, bias, or the subjective experience
of pain. The final area is human brain “enhancement” through
neuroscience technologies. My own work has surveyed these
issues and analyzed some of them.37
Research, 311 SCIENCE 783 (2004) (discussing ethical issues that have arisen
incidentally from brain-imaging research); Brian S. Kim et al., Incidental
Findings on Pediatric MR Images of the Brain, 23 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY
1674 (2002) (discussing incidental abnormalities found in brain MR imaging
studies).
36. See Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific
Approach to Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1709 (2004) (examining developments
in neuroscience that provide insight into brain processes involved in
normative judgment).
The entire November 2004 publication of the
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, is devoted
to “Law and the Brain,” with a focus on neuroimaging and normative
decisionmaking.
37. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and
Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications of Advances in
Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 114
[hereinafter Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property] (exploring
the social and legal consequences that neuroscience could bring); Henry T.
Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal
Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE,
AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 245 [hereinafter Greely, The Social Effects]
(examining how developments in neuroscience will affect law and the legal
system); Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval Regulation for Lie Detection:
An Idea Whose Time May Be Coming, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2005) (discussing
the development of technically assisted lie detection and its use inside the
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Neuroscience will share some of the issues examined by
ELSI research, allowing it to build on that work as appropriate.
The area that seems most likely to be strongly similar is
prediction; areas of lesser but still substantial overlap include
manipulation, the privacy area of ownership and control,
cultural impacts, research uses, and enhancement. Other
questions, however, such as those of identity, uncovering the
past, patents, personal property, source of ethics, competence,
and mind reading, exist largely in either ELSI or neuroethics,
but not in both.
B. PREDICTION: THE STRONGEST LINK BETWEEN NEUROETHICS
AND ELSI
The correspondence between neuroethics and ELSI is
strongest in prediction.
Genetics can predict—sometimes
powerfully, sometimes weakly—a person’s future health and
other traits. There has been great concern that insurers,
employers, and others might use this information against
people. Neuroscience will similarly be able to predict the
future diseases or traits of people, again strongly or weakly,
with the potential for similar consequences.38 For living people,
neuroscience predictions may well have a broader effect than
genetic ones; for embryos or fetuses, however, genetic
prediction will probably remain much more powerful.
For living people, neuroscience has an advantage over
genetics in that it can look at the present condition of the brain,
which should allow it to make a greater number of strong
predictions than genetics. The genetic variations a person has
(apart from mutations acquired during life, which are mainly
important in cancers) are established when her zygote is
formed by the meeting of egg and sperm. Making strong
predictions from the genetic variations inherited at that
earliest moment leaves out all the consequences of time,
chance, and experience.39 A thirty-year-old woman has had
courtroom as well as in other disciplines).
38. The two fields will sometimes cover exactly the same technologies.
For example, genetic tests can already be used to predict Huntington’s disease,
an uncommon, progressive, and deadly neurological disorder usually
diagnosed in middle age, raising not only issues of discrimination but when, to
whom, and how such tests should be offered. As Huntington’s disease is a
neurological disease, these ELSI issues are also neuroethics issues.
39. This refers to the traditional predictive uses of genetics, in which
inherited genetic variations are correlated with various outcomes. It turns
out, however, that not only is the sequence of a gene important in how the
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thirty years and nine months during which other factors may
have affected her inherited genetic tendencies. On the other
hand, neuroimaging of the same woman can reveal the
structure and function of the brain as it has been affected by
those years; other tests may reveal real-time levels of various
crucial molecules. There is no opportunity for intervening
causes; behavior will be a function of how that brain and its
neurons work. Her genetic inheritance will be one part of how
her brain and neurons work and, in some cases, like
Huntington’s disease, it will be a determinative part. But in
most neurological diseases, mental illnesses, or behavioral
traits, genetics will play a smaller part. The “penetrance” of
the genetic variations—the percentage of people with a
particular set of such variations (the “genotype”) who have the
disease, illness, or trait (the “phenotype”)—will be fairly small.
It seems likely that the “penetrance” of the structural,
functional, or biochemical aspects of the brain that are used to
make predictions can be much higher.
For example, for a very small number of people, genetic
tests can already predict a near certainty of future Alzheimer’s
disease in either early-onset or late-onset forms. Genetic tests
can provide weak predictions of somewhat heightened risk
(well under fifty percent) for about one-third of the
population.40 On the other hand, neuroimaging of amyloid
plaques or tau protein tangles of people in their sixties, or even
their fifties, may well lead to successful prediction of which
elderly people are going to be diagnosed with Alzheimer’s
disease.41 Neuroimaging should actually be able to see the
body (and the brain) functions, but so is when and how a gene is used—when
it is “expressed” through the production of proteins or RNA. Some of those
changes are themselves inherited, not through changes in the sequence of the
DNA but through various modifications to it. These modifications are called
“epigenetics.” Expression of genes, however, is also very often affected by
subsequent events or signals. If one considers this kind of “expression
analysis” as genetics, it may have the same kind of temporal advantages for
predictions as neuroscience.
(Currently, however, direct study of the
expression of genes in the brain requires fresh samples of brain tissue, a
distinct disadvantage when studying live humans.)
40. See, e.g., L.M. McConnell, B.A. Koenig, H.T. Greely & T.A. Raffin,
Genetic Testing and Alzheimer Disease: Has the Time Come? 4 NATURE MED.
757, 758 (1998) (discussing the current inadequacy of genetic testing to
accurately predict Alzheimer’s disease, noting that just over a quarter of
Caucasian adults have the appropriate genetic make-up for mere diagnostic
testing).
41. See, e.g., H. van Dyck, Neuroimaging in Alzheimer’s Disease:
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progression of the disease from asymptomatic levels to deadly
ones, thus extending all the problems of prediction to a much
larger group of people.
Genetic tests can predict some other, relatively rare,
neurological conditions, but although genetic associations are
believed to exist, researchers have not found genetic variations
that allow strong predictions about common mental illnesses,
such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, various addictions, or depression. Genetics may
ultimately be able to make such predictions, but experience
thus far makes it plausible that, at least for most people, these
diseases will prove such complicated mixtures of environmental
influences, variations in multiple genes, and luck that only
weak predictions will be possible. The ability of neuroimaging
to see both the structures of the brain and the functioning of its
parts holds out the possibility that it may be able to make
strong predictions about who will develop these disabling
illnesses. Increased knowledge from non-imaging neuroscience
technologies may also lead to useful predictions.
An estimated twenty-two percent of adults suffer, in any
given year, from mental health disorders, 42thus again
potentially expanding the number of people against whom such
predictions could be used. The stigma that continues to follow
mental illness makes the possibility of discrimination even
stronger. Of course, for mental illnesses as for neurological
diseases, if the ability accurately to predict the disease brought
with it an ability effectively to treat the disease, people would
happily endure the risks of prediction.
If, however,
neuroscience follows the same path as genetics, good
predictions will exist long before any good treatments, which,
in both areas, makes the balance of costs and benefits of such
predictions—at least for the individual involved—ambiguous.
But the predictive power of neuroscience may be even
wider than neurological diseases or mental illness and may go
far beyond what genetics can do. Personality traits and
cognitive abilities are, after all, a function of how the brain
works. Some of these may have some genetic associations, but
those have proven so complex as to be unknown, at least except
Relevance for Treatment, 3 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 13 (2001); C. Wu et al.,
Amyloid Imaging: From Benchtop to Bedside, 70 CURRENT TOPICS IN
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 171 (2005).
42. Mental Health InfoSource, Mental Health Information and Statistics,
http://www.mhsource.com/resource/mh.html (last visited March 3, 2006).
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in the most extreme cases. Some forms of intelligence, for
example, seem to have genetic associations, but genetics can
predict only the pathologically low levels of intelligence that are
called mental retardation—and only a small percentage even of
that. On the other hand, various mental skills or personal
characteristics might be predicted, or revealed, by neuroscience
testing. Of course, in general if one wants to determine a
person’s math skills, a math test is a better method than an
fMRI. Such predictions might be helpful in connection with
educational or career counseling for children, although a
prediction of skills may also end up as a burdensome limitation,
particularly if it is imperfect.
But such predictions could also be helpful in quite different
cases of predicting future behavior, where the behavior either
cannot be tested for directly or the subject of the test has
reason to conceal it. Consider predictions about a criminal’s
future dangerousness or the likelihood that someone is, or will
become, a sexual predator or a sociopath. Although genetic
associations have occasionally been put forward for such traits,
most notoriously in the alleged (and false) propensity to
violence of men with one X and two Y chromosomes,43 they
have failed. It is much more plausible that neuroscience
predictions will be more accurate—or that they will be wrongly
taken as more accurate. The implications of those predictions,
for the criminal justice system among other things, may prove
much more substantial than those of genetic predictions. But
the effects may reach beyond the justice system. Claims of
43. For a discussion of the early studies, see P.A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive
Behaviour, Mental Subnormality and the XYY Male, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965).
For a discussion of how the study was discredited, see Deborah W. Denno,
Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 615, 620-22 (Dec. 1988). A more scientifically legitimate “violence
gene” has subsequently been identified. A defect that makes inoperative the
gene called MAO-A has been shown to lead to men with below average
intelligence and a history of violent behavior, sexual assault, and arson. This
mutation, however, has been found only in the Netherlands and there, only in
one family. Avashalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence
in Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002) (reporting results of the
study); Erik Stokstad, Violent Effects of Abuse Tied to Gene, 297 SCIENCE 752
(2002) (commenting on the study). It cannot “explain” violence. Another gene,
called SRY, is found in almost all people who commit violent crimes; people
without that gene are highly unlikely to commit violent crimes. This is the
gene most directly involved in making those who carry it male. Although
maleness is strongly associated with violence, that particular genetic test does
not seem very useful.
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genetic connections to sexual preference, though highly
publicized, have not been proven. It seems plausible that
neuroscience testing might be more successful than genetic
tests in predicting the eventual sexual preferences of children,
adolescents, or adults, although it is not clear whether they
would be accurate as other, already existing, tests.44 One can
imagine parents, or others, seeking that kind of information,
perhaps to attempt interventions.
Although neuroscience is likely to do a better job than
genetics of predicting brain-related characteristics of living
people, it probably will not be as important as genetics for
predicting the characteristics of “future people”—fetuses and
embryos. Those kinds of predictions give rise to some of the
most controversial issues in ELSI, including state-sponsored
eugenics and parental choice about their children’s genetic
traits. Part of the reason for the weakness of neuroscience is
the other side of its strength with living people; with a fetus or
an embryo, there is little or no accumulation of the effects of
environment and chance. To the extent that brain-related
traits are functions, at all, of post-birth events whose marks are
visible to neuroscience but not to genetics, they cannot be
predicted successfully before birth. There is another, more
fundamental reason, however. The embryo and fetus lacks, at
first, any structure of a brain; for much longer it lacks any
discernible brain function.
To the extent neuroscience
predictions rest on brain structure and function, they are
impossible unless that structure or function can be detected.
The weakness of prenatal neuroscience is relative, not
absolute. It is possible, for example, to get structural images of
the brains of later term fetuses through MRI. It is possible
that those screening technologies could be used to pick up some
gross abnormalities in the developing brain, from anencephaly
(a fatal condition where a child is born without a cerebrum) to
possibly some forms of mental retardation or cerebral palsy. At
this point it is not clear what conditions could be detected using
fetal MRI or at what stage of development they could be seen.
It is at least possible that neuroscience methods might
44. The penile plethysmograph, for instance, is a crudely straightforward
test that involves measuring a male subject’s physical arousal as he is
presented with a variety of sexual images depicting men, women, and
children. Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and Perversity: The Use of the Penile
Plethysmograph on Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 9 (2004). It is commonly used in sex offender treatment programs.
Id. at 7-8.
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ultimately lead parents to decide to abort some fetuses with
serious structural brain problems.
C. AREAS WITH LESSER BUT SUBSTANTIAL OVERLAP
Neuroscience predictions seem likely to raise ethical issues
quite similar, but not quite identical, to the concerns that stem
from genetic predictions. Other uses of neuroscience will raise
issues somewhat less similar to those raised by genetics with
respect to manipulation, privacy, cultural impacts, research
ethics, and enhancement.
1. Manipulation/Intervention
Most of the discussion of genetic manipulation in humans
has centered on so-called gene therapy,45 where properly
functioning copies of genes are transferred in order to cure
genetic diseases in living people, called somatic cell gene
therapy, or to prevent genetic diseases in future generations,
called germ line gene therapy or inheritable genetic
modification. (There has also been substantial controversy
about moving genes from one non-human species to another
non-human species for agricultural purposes; this seems
unlikely to happen significantly in neuroscience, except in
laboratory research where it should not be controversial.) After
some early concerns about the idea of modifying a person’s
genome, the idea of somatic cell gene therapy to cure disease
has not been controversial, although research ethics issues
about how to carry out these investigations remain. The idea of
somatic cell gene therapy not for treating disease or disability
but for enhancing abilities beyond normal, however, does
remain controversial.
Neuroscientific “manipulations,” perhaps better termed
“direct interventions,” are likely to follow a similar path. The
idea of intervening directly in people’s brains, by electronic
implants or other intrusive methods, will evoke discomfort,
particularly to the extent, parallel to genetic essentialism, that
45. The term “gene therapy” is not a good one as there have not yet been
any clinically accepted therapies as a result of this technique of gene transfer.
“Gene transfer research” would be a better term for it, but this article will use
the more widely understood term “gene therapy.” And, ironically, as the field
of gene transfer research has developed, far more research has gone into using
gene transfer to combat diseases that are not caused, substantially or at all, by
inherited genes, such as cancer and AIDS.
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the brain is perceived as a person’s “essence.” This is parallel
to the uneasiness prompted by other intrusive interventions in
the brain, whether eventually dismissed as medically
inappropriate, like prefrontal lobotomies,46 or remaining in
some clinical use, like electro-convulsive therapy. As long,
however, as the neuroscientific interventions are for the
purpose of curing or alleviating disease or injury, their
intrusions will be uneasily accepted, as, indeed, we currently
accept such implanted brain devices as cochlear implants for
deafness and deep brain stimulation for the treatment of
Parkinson’s disease.
Neuroscience interventions for
enhancement, however, will be quite controversial and are
discussed below.
There seems to be no likely neuroscience equivalent to
concerns over germ line gene therapy.
Such genetic
intervention is controversial because it may be transmitted to
future generations; neuroscience interventions do not have the
same potential for passing down to the families of their
recipients.
On the other hand, the issue of human/non-human
chimeras has already become more controversial in
neuroscience than in genetics. Transferring human genes into
non-human organisms is the most important technique of the
biotechnology industry: find a human gene for a therapeutic
protein (insulin, erythropoietin, granulocyte-macrophage colony
stimulating factor), move it into non-human cells (E. coli, yeast,
Chinese hamster ovary cells), and let those cells pump out
commercial quantities of the human protein. That this creates
cells that are, genetically, part human and part non-human,
has not caused concern, or even attracted much notice. Of
course, moving a large number of human genes into a nonhuman creature (particularly a near relative like one of the
great apes) or moving genes from a non-human species into
humans would be likely quite controversial.
In neuroscience, when Irv Weissman, a Stanford
researcher, proposed to transplant human brain stem cells into
fetal mice, he sparked a substantial controversy.47 Senator
46. It is worth remembering that the invention of the prefrontal lobotomy,
now generally viewed as a tragic and barbaric mistake, led to the award of the
Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology to Egas Moniz of Portugal in 1949.
47. See generally Henry T. Greely, Defining Chimeras . . . and Chimeric
Concerns, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17 (2003) (discussing the definition of “chimera”
and how a better definition will enhance understanding of ethical issues of
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Brownback introduced legislation to make such research a
felony;48 President Bush, supporting that legislation in his 2006
State of the Union address, called “creating human-animal
hybrids” one of “the most egregious abuses of medical
research”;49 and even the National Academy of Sciences panel
on human embryonic stem cell research guidelines called on
researchers to use special caution when transplanting human
stem cells into the brains of non-human animals.50 The
potential value of such human/non-human chimeras for
research into human brain cells makes it likely that this debate
will continue.
2. Privacy
Genetic information has sparked worries about privacy for
two different reasons. One is the concern about the negative
ways genetic information might be used against the person
tested. The other is a less instrumental concern, a feeling of
invasion of an especially personal, private, or important aspect
of a person. Privacy feels particularly important in the genetic
context because genetic information is not generally obvious
but is instead usually “hidden.” (Of course, not all genetic
information is hidden; a person’s sex is almost completely
determined by genes, as are various superficial characteristics
cellular and genetic transplantation between animal species); Mark Greene et
al., Moral Issues of Human–Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting, 309
SCIENCE 385 (2005) (discussing controversial findings that resulted from
implanting human brain cells into mice in the larger context of brain-cell
implants between various animals); Phillip Karpowicz et al., Developing
Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in Human Stem Cell Research: Ethical Issues
and Boundaries, 15 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (2005) (discussing
transplantation of human brain cells into prenatal nonhumans and related
ethical concerns); Jason Scott Robert & Françoise Baylis, Crossing Species
Boundaries, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2003) (exploring the moral boundaries
involved in the emerging field of combining human and nonhuman animals at
the genetic and cellular level); Henry T. Greely, Outline of Talk to NAS Panel
on Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 7-13 (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://dels.nas.edu/bls/stemcells/Greelyoutline.pdf
(discussing
Weissman
proposed experiments).
48. See Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 659, 109th Cong.
(2005).
49. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/2006013110.html.
50. See COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC
STEM CELL RESEARCH 50, 55 (2005).
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like skin color, eye color, and hair color.) Information about an
individual derived from neuroscience seems likely to be at least
as sensitive. It is equally susceptible to use against the person
tested; it is at least equally personal, private, and important;
and equally hidden—or hideable.
And both genetic and
neuroscience information will have substantial legitimate uses
that will make protecting the information all the more difficult.
3. Cultural Effects
The likely cultural impacts of genetics include its
consequences for health, for our views of race, for our
relationship with non-human life, and for genetic determinism
or essentialism. Neuroscience certainly may have effects on
society similar to those of genetics through changes in human
disease and age of death, although the details may differ. The
long-term social consequences of, for example, a substantial
extension of the age of high mental functioning, could be
extensive. Like genetics, neuroscience might also affect our
views of race. Neuroscience seems likely to provide yet more
proof of the irrelevance of “race” to mental ability, although, at
the same time, one would have to be alert to possible racist
misuse of any small variations that might be found.
It is less clear whether or not neuroscience will raise
cultural issues similar to those of genetics on other points.
Genetics establishes common links—common genes and DNA
sequences—between humans and other living things. It might
(or might not) cause us to accord more respect to other living
things. It remains to be seen what neuroscience tells us about
the mental lives of other species and what conclusions we will
draw from its findings. The most common forms of life on
earth—microbes—obviously will not share our mental world,
nor will fungi, plants, or most small or simple animals. But, as
we come to understand the brain activities that mean planning,
pleasure, or pain in humans, will we or will we not find similar
activity in the brains of octopi or whales, of dogs or cats, of
monkeys or chimpanzees? And how would either answer affect
our relationship to those species?
The last area of possible deep cultural significance from
genetics involves the relationship between individuals and
their genomes. One version of this relationship has been called
“genetic determinism,” the idea that our genes determine our
lives. As Time magazine once quoted James Watson, “We used
to think our fate was in the stars. Now we know in large
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measure, our fate is in our genes.”51 For almost all of us,
Watson was wrong. Unless we are unusually unlucky and are
born with completely penetrant, untreatable, and serious
genetic disease, genes are only one component—sometimes
large, often small—in our fates. Much ELSI discussion has
focused on the falsity of genetic determinism and the dangers
an exaggerated view of genes’ power could pose. It is possible
that a neuroscience determinism, accurate or inaccurate, could
arise. On the other hand, although our genomes are fixed
ninth months before our birth, we know that our brains change,
and are changeable, throughout our lives. The complex and
plastic nature of our brains makes them a less plausible,
though still not impossible, source of determinism than our
genes.
“Genetic essentialism” is somewhat different from genetic
determinism. Genetic essentialism asserts that our individual
genomes are, in some important sense, our true, essential
selves. The ELSI literature contains some discussion of genetic
essentialism, but it has never seemed a serious threat. Such a
view would mean that identical twins, who share the same
genome, were, essentially, the same person, something anyone
who has known identical twins is likely to reject. It also rejects
any role for experience or chance in the making of our
individual essence, which is also unlikely to be accepted, as
everyone will have lived through experiences that seemed to be
fundamentally important to his or her nature.
Genetic
essentialism, in any non-trivial sense, is just not plausible.
Neuroessentialism, however, seems much more plausible.
If we could successfully transplant my brain into your body,
would the resulting person be me with a new body or you with
a new brain? I believe almost all of us would say it was me
with a new body—that the “essence” of the person is the brain,
not the body. My views on this may be influenced by many
decades spent in settings—as a student, an attorney, and a
professor—where the brain was particularly valued, yet I
suspect the same reaction would be very widespread, if not
universal.
Neuroethics may well have to deal with a
widespread public acceptance of neuroessentialism, where
ELSI never had to deal with a broad belief in genetic
essentialism. It is not at all clear whether that will raise
51. Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62, 67.
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ethical, legal, or social problems.
4. Research Ethics
ELSI has engaged, and neuroethics will engage, issues of
research ethics, but with different emphases. ELSI has been
concerned with many different questions of research ethics, but
three areas have received particular attention. One group of
issues has revolved around the creation of large DNA
repositories. These repositories have provoked concerns about
the consent necessary when people are giving permission to use
their genetic material (and their personal health information)
for an indefinite amount of future research on undetermined
(and perhaps undreamt of) issues and about the confidentiality
of that material and information. A second set of problems
deals with research on human populations and what kinds of
consent or consultation may be appropriate from the group as a
whole, as opposed to individual members of the group
participating in research. A third set of research questions,
related to those of ownership, deals with whether research
subjects are fairly treated if they receive no financial benefits
while researchers create valuable products from their DNA and
health information.
These have some possible analogues in neuroethics. Some
databases of MRI and fMRI data are being created for general
use of researchers, raising issues of consent by the research
participants and the confidentiality of their information. These
databases are not very advanced in neuroscience and, as far as
I know, there is not (yet) much individual health or other
personal information associated with them, but this could
become a concern.
The issues around population research seem less related to
neuroethics but not irrelevant. Geneticists often look at
particular ethnic or cultural groups in medical research
because some groups will have a much greater burden of a
particular genetic disease. Populations, like families, are more
likely to share some genetic variations with each other than
with outsiders. Finding genetic variations linked to the disease
is easier in populations (or families) in which the disease is
common. This could also lead, however, to harms to the entire
group through stigmatization and discrimination. Neurological
diseases, mental illnesses, or personality traits seem much less
likely to be usefully studied in particular ethnic groups as there
seems no a priori reason to think that any causes of such
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phenotypes (other than genetic causes) are likely to be
concentrated within the group.
Still, the risks that
neuroscience research might harm a population (ethnic or
otherwise) cannot be dismissed. Some group-based research
might occur, seeking environmental or other causes if a brainrelated phenotype were particularly common in a group, which
could potentially lead to harm. Perhaps more plausibly, more
general research on brain-related traits could cause harm;
consider, for example, the possibility of an exaggerated public
reaction to a study that said that based on neuroimaging,
“female brains” are not as good as “male brains” at
mathematics.
It is unclear how strong the issues of financial fairness
may be in neuroethics. As discussed below, it seems unlikely
that patents on brain structures will be significant, unlike
patents on genes. Although we hope neuroscience will lead to
successful treatments, and successful treatments are likely to
mean profitable products, without the sense (accurate or not)
that part of a discrete individual’s body—his genes—have been
used to make that profitable product, the ethical concerns may
not be as great.
This uneven relationship runs the other way as well. The
biggest research ethics issue in neuroethics has been incidental
findings. When researchers perform MRIs for research, they
typically look for effects across the entire brain.
It is
disconcertingly common to see unexpected odd things in the
brains of research subjects, even young and healthy subjects.
Some studies report finding abnormalities of uncertain
importance in the brains of as many as forty percent of
research subjects. Most of the time those incidental findings
have no apparent medical significance, or at least none known
to the researchers. What to do about those findings, both in
investigating them and in telling the subjects about them, is
unclear.
The issue of returning information about medical risks has
been occasionally raised in ELSI, but it has not taken a central
position.52 Traditional genetics research has focused on a few
“target” genes. The ability did not exist to look at a vast
number of the subject’s genes for abnormalities, so any findings

52. See Henry T. Greely, Human Genomics Research: New Challenges for
Research Ethics, 44 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 221, 225-26 (2001).
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of abnormalities were not “incidental” but were part of the
planned research—and presumably issues of follow-up and
disclosure were anticipated. As microarrays, cheap sequencing,
and other new technologies make it possible to look at
hundreds of thousands of genetic variations at once, genetics
research is having to confront these same issues of incidental
findings.53 Here neuroethics may help inform ELSI.
5. Enhancement
Questions of human biological enhancement arise in both
genetics and in neuroscience, but in significantly different
ways. Enhancement issues are deeply interesting, whether in
genetics, neuroscience, athletic-performing enhancing drugs, or
cosmetic surgery.54
In genetics, issues of enhancement arise from one of two
mechanisms: prenatal selection or gene transfer (either somatic
or, more commonly, germ line).55 The first method is limited to
selecting among possible children based on their genetic
variations and the traits associated with them, through fetal
testing, abortion, or, for parents using in vitro fertilization
methods, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and selective
53. Within the past year I have been a member of one working group
convened at Stanford to make recommendations on incidental findings in
genetics research and have spoken to a second working group, at the
University of Minnesota, on the same topic.
54. I have analyzed some of these issues in detail recently. See, e.g.,
Henry T. Greely, Disabilities, Enhancements, and the Meanings of Sports, 15
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 99 (2004); Henry T. Greely, Regulating Human
Biological Enhancements: Questionable Justifications and International
Complications, U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV./SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. (joint issue)
(forthcoming 2006). Other useful discussions include: ALLEN BUCHANAN ET
AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); CARL ELLIOTT,
BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2003); MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND
THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY (2003); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (2003);
SHEILA M. ROTHMAN & DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION:
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF MEDICAL ENHANCEMENT (2003); Francis M.
Kamm, Is There a Problem with Enhancement?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5 (2005);
and Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Apr. 2004, at 51
55. One might also view as “genetic” the use of drugs produced through
genetic engineering or genetic knowledge, such as the use of Epogen (a
biotechnology-produced version of the natural protein erythropoieten) for
boosting an athlete’s red blood cell count. The source of the drug in genetic
technologies, however, does not seem to distinguish it substantially from drugs
produced in other ways, such as anabolic steroids.
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implantation. These methods raise important ethical and
constitutional issues of parental control over reproduction.56
The second method can be used in living people (as well as in
fetuses, embryos, eggs, or sperm) for either somatic cell gene
therapy or germ line gene therapy, but has the disadvantage
that it has not been shown to be possible, let alone safe and
effective.
The first approach and the germ line version of the second
approach will have implications for future generations. And all
of the genetic approaches are only as powerful as the strength
of the connections between particular genetic variations and
desired traits. Except for a few, usually uncommon, diseases,
those connections are currently weak or nonexistent; although
reasonably strong connections to cosmetic traits (such as hair
color, eye color, skin color, and nose shape) seem likely to come
soon, it is not clear when or if we will ever have strong
connections to other, more important traits.57
Neuroscience enhancement is likely to involve both
pharmacological enhancements (“steroids for the brain”) and
various kinds of implanted interfaces between the brain and
electronic devices (“neuroelectronic interfaces”). Some of these
already exist. Caffeine, alcohol, Prozac®, Ritalin®, Provigil®,
and other drugs—some traditional and others approved by the
FDA—are among many of the legal compounds that are
sometimes taken to affect brain function, not just by the ill, but
by normal, healthy people. Cochlear implants use electronic
signals to stimulate the auditory nerve so that some of the deaf
can hear; technologies under development pick up signals from
a quadriplegic person’s brain and use them to allow that
disabled person to operate a computer. These may well expand
in the near future to be useful to healthy people.58
Neuroscience enhancement issues do not implicate
decisions about childbearing, but some of their hardest
questions may involve questions of government control over

56. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29
AM. J. L. & MED. 439 (2003).
57. See Henry T. Greely, Seeking More Goodly Creatures, 6 CEREBRUM 49,
51-53 (2004); Henry T. Greely, Human Genetic Enhancement: A Lawyer’s
View, 17 MED. HUMANITIES REV. 42 (2003) (reviewing MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN,
WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY
(2003)).
58. See Greely, The Social Effects, supra note 37, at 255-56.
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parental decisions about childrearing, whether in the
government’s power to prevent parents from using
neuroenhancement techniques on their children or in the
parents’ power to refuse neuroenhancement methods
demanded by the government. Neuroscience enhancement will
not pass in any direct biological way from one generation to the
next, thus avoiding any issues of a biological “caste” system
(what Mehlman referred to as a “genobility”).59
On the other hand, it seems likely that neuroscience
enhancements will be more common and more powerful than
genetic ones. The link between the present functioning of the
brain and characteristics, primarily behaviors, that we will
view as enhancements will be much more direct than links
between genetic variations and behavior. And, to the extent
neuroscience enhancement takes the form of healthy people
using (legally or illegally) pharmaceuticals that were developed
for, and are widely marketed to, sick or disabled people—such
as possible memory-enhancing pills prescribed for dementia—
controlling those technologies will prove very difficult. And, of
course, neuroscience enhancements will, by definition, involve
the brain, which, as the discussion above of neuroessentialism
indicated, may in fact be of unique importance to our sense of
our own personhood and of our species’ humanity.
D. DIVERGENT ISSUES
Many issues of concern to ELSI do not seem likely to be
significant questions for neuroethics. These include questions
of identity, revealing the past, patents, and personal property.
At the same time, many neuroethics issues, such as the
neuroscientific basis (if any) for ethics, questions of
competence, and the problems of mind reading, have little or no
parallel in ELSI.
Genetics raises important questions of identity, not only
through the forensic use of DNA to identify the source of
human cells and tissues, from crime scenes, disasters, and
elsewhere, but also, at least in some approaches, ethnic
identity.60 Also, human reproductive cloning attracts special
59. Cf. MEHLMAN, supra note 54, at 108-20.
60. See Henry T. Greely, Genetic Genealogy:
Genetics Meets the
Marketplace, in REVISITING RACE IN A GENOMIC AGE (Barbara Koenig &
Sandra Lee eds., forthcoming 2006); Kimberly TallBear, Native-AmericanDNA.com: In Search of Native American Race and Tribe, in REVISITING RACE
IN A GENOMIC AGE, supra.
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interest among various forms of assisted reproduction only
because of the genetic identity between the cloned baby and the
DNA donor. Neuroscience seems to have nothing to add in
those areas.
Genetics can also use DNA to reveal the past—the past of
famous individuals, like Thomas Jefferson or Abraham
Lincoln;61 the pasts (and futures) of many living people through
paternity determinations; the pasts of ethnic groups;62 or the
past of humanity as a whole.63 Neuroscience can do none of
that. At its most speculative, neuroscience might help clarify
the history as perceived by living people by assessing the
accuracy or authenticity of memories, but it is not clear that
such a method is even conceivable.
Patents arising from genetic technologies, whether patents
on genes, on living organisms, or on human biological
materials, have been a major source of ethical, legal, and
political debate.64 It seems unlikely that anything similar to
patents on the composition of matter that is a gene will come
out of neuroscience.65 Some neuroscientists may end up
patenting the use of certain patterns of brain activity in
screening or diagnosis, but those kinds of patents, although
causing some concern, have been less controversial in genetics
and are likely to have similar consequences in neuroscience.
The ownership of the actual physical “things” that make up
genetic samples or other human biological materials has
remained controversial and surprisingly unsettled. The Moore
decision66 is only law in California and a few states that have
61. See, e.g., David M. Abbey, The Thomas Jefferson Paternity Case, 397
NATURE 32 (1999); Eugene Foster et al., Jefferson Fathered Slave’s Last Child,
396 NATURE 27 (1998); Eric S. Lander & Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Father, 396
NATURE 13 (1998); Victor A. McKusick, Advisory Statement by the Panel on
DNA Testing of Abraham Lincoln's Tissue, 7 CADUCEUS 43 (1991).
62. The story of the Lemba, a southern African tribe that apparently has
substantial Jewish ancestry, is one fascinating example. See Nicholas Wade,
DNA Backs a Tribe's Tradition of Early Descent from the Jews, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1999, at A1.
63. See LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA & FRANCESCO CAVALLI-SFORZA, THE
GREAT HUMAN DIASPORAS: THE HISTORY OF DIVERSITY AND EVOLUTION
(Sarah Thorne trans., Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. 1995) (1993).
64. For a good summary of the issues, see THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2002).
65. See Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property, supra note
37, at 114.
66. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
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expressly followed it, and even that decision can be read
narrowly. Although there may still be tough questions of the
relative rights of researchers and research subjects to
ownership and control over “things” produced in research,
neuroscience seems unlikely to raise issues of personal
property. The relevant research materials in neurosciences
will be information, produced by neuroimaging and other
technologies, but will not often be physical pieces of brains (or
cerebrospinal fluid).
Moving to neuroethics issues, research into the basis in the
brain for human ethics has an equivalent, but not in ELSI. The
overlapping fields of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and
behavior biology look for, among other things, genetic or
evolutionary explanations for human ethical judgments.67
ELSI researchers have largely ignored these fields, probably
because discoverable links between genetic variations and the
broad and often amorphous behavioral characteristics that
constitute human ethical and moral responses seem somewhere
between distant and highly improbable.
Neuroscience is likely to play a substantial role in our
understanding of, and assignment of, competence or, more
broadly, free will.
Although it seems unlikely that
neuroscience will so completely overturn our views of human
free will as to change the criminal justice system (and our
ethics) fundamentally,68 it may certainly provide a better
understanding of what it means to be competent as well as
what is useful evidence in specific cases. Although there have
been some ill-fated efforts to use genetic defenses to criminal
responsibility, the connection between inherited genes and
current competence does not seem very useful. People with
very strong genetic evidence of lack of competence—people with
severe mental retardation from a genetic cause—will not need
to add genetic evidence to their overpowering behavioral
evidence. Weaker connections between genes and, for example,
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
67. See, e.g., EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS
(1975); THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
GENERATION OF CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); Owen D. Jones
& Timothy S. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
405 (2005). But see DAVID J. BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS: EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PERSISTENT QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (2005)
(providing a detailed critique of Evolutionary Psychology).
68. See Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 157, 158-81.
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violent behavior seem unlikely to be sufficiently strong as to be
convincing. A nice example of the difference might be the
difference between a genetic test showing that a particular
person is predisposed to develop the disease and an MRI
showing, in that person’s brain, the accumulation of the
amyloid plaques, tau tangles, and neuronal death that defines
the disease.
Finally, some of the most far-reaching ethical, legal, and
social implications of neuroscience arise from the possibility
that it may help us “read minds.”
By neuroscientific
determination of patterns of neuronal activity, we may be able
to know, or at least make a powerful guess about, what a
person is perceiving, what emotions that person is feeling,
whether she is lying or telling the truth, or even what she is
thinking. Genetics might, at most, be able to tell us whether a
person has a predisposition to be happy or sad, or has strong or
weak sensory organs, but it cannot say anything about an
actual state of mind.
III. ELSI AND NEUROETHICS ALONG THE PATH AHEAD
ELSI is both a set of intellectual issues to be explored and
a federally-financed program (or two) with substantial funding.
Neuroethics is highly unlikely to be the subject of a similar
program, but it will be—and already has been—a beneficiary of
the ELSI programs. And nascent programs in “nanoethics”
provide another useful comparison.
In the United States, the government-funded ELSI
programs were the product of three factors: a major scientific
initiative funded by federal agencies, the ready availability of
money to spend on ethics, and a need for political cover on the
issues involved.69 The Human Genome Project was the “big
science” project of its generation, an expensive, high profile,
and long-term research enterprise. With funding projected at
$3 billion over fifteen years, the idea of spending a few percent
on ethics was easy to swallow, particularly as budgets for the
Project were generous throughout the late 1990s and
technology lowered the costs of doing the research. And, as
Cook-Deegan’s history of the creation of the Project so clearly
69. I suspect the same factors were involved in ELSI programs set up by
other countries, but I know too little about those programs, and the history of
the Human Genome Project in those countries, to speak to them.
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points out, public concern about genetics, reflected in Congress,
made it crucial that the Project sponsors address, or appear to
address, the ethical issues.70
Neuroethics lacks all three factors. There is no Human
Brain Project. The Decade of the Brain came and went without
a correlative “big science” project, and it is difficult to see
something like the Human Genome Project developing in
neuroscience. Part of the appeal of the Human Genome Project
was that it had concrete goals—first mapping, then sequencing
the “entire” human genome.71 The National Human Genome
Research Institute is able to argue to extend those goals to
understanding the functions of that sequence. In theory, one
might be able to propose mapping the connections and
functions of all 100 billion neurons in the human brain, but
both the science and the technology seem completely
inadequate to address those goals, even leaving aside questions
of whether such a map and such functions would be uniform
across different people and their brains.
The National Human Genome Research Institute played
the major funding and coordinating role in the Human Genome
Project, although with substantial contributions (and a little
competition) from the Department of Energy. Neuroscience,
and hence neuroethics, has no one major funding agency
behind it. The NIH provides a huge part of the funding for
neuroscience, but at least three different institutes play major
roles: the NINDS, the NIMH, and the National Institute on
Aging (NIA). And each is roughly the same size; for fiscal year
2006, the President requested budgets for them of $1.5 billion,
$1.4 billion, and $1.1 billion respectively. The lack of a
70. See COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 9, at 248.
71. In spite of happy press releases, the Human Genome Project did not,
and will not, exactly achieve those goals. First, it is hard to say what “the”
Human Genome is. There are about 6.4 billion human beings alive today.
Each one has two genomes, one inherited from each parent, plus millions of
variations caused by mutations since conception in particular lineages of cells.
Except for identical twins, each of those two genomes is unique (and the
millions of variations caused by post-conception mutations exist even in
identical twins). Even if one accepts a narrow definition of “the human
genome” as a complete sequence of at least one copy of each of the twenty-four
chromosomes (one through twenty-two plus the X and Y), the Human Genome
Project still fell short. About twenty percent of the genome, a portion called
the “heterochromatin,” is technically quite difficult to sequence and contains
few, if any, genes. It is unclear when, if ever, these roughly 600 million base
pairs will be sequenced. See Lincoln D. Stein, Human Genome: End of the
Beginning, 431 NATURE 915 (2004).
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dominant institutional sponsor is another drawback for
neuroethics.
Even if some “big science” project were plausible,
budgetary realities make it politically unlikely. The short
period of federal budget surpluses in the late 1990s has
disappeared.
Although federal spending has increased
substantially in the last five years, the increases have come
largely in defense, national security, and entitlement programs,
like Social Security and Medicare. “Demographic realities”—
code for the aging of my baby boomer generation—mean that
the entitlement programs will consume ever larger amounts of
the federal budget. On any realistic assessment, unless
politically unpopular tax increases are adopted, huge federal
deficits stretch into the indefinite future. And, at a more
specific level, after the unprecedented doubling of the NIH
budget from 1998 to 2003, NIH appropriations are dropping in
inflation-adjusted terms. Multi-billion dollar brain projects are
not currently imaginable.
Finally, there just is not the level of public concern about
the implications of neuroscience that drove the political
demand for an ELSI program. That could change. The reasons
for public interest and concern are substantial, but public
knowledge about the advances of neuroscience is very limited.
It is conceivable that early neuroethics work might lay a
foundation for more public concern and hence could result in
political pressure for some neuroethics funding. On the other
hand, to the extent that neuroethics research comes directly
from health-related research—unlike the Human Genome
Project—any public concerns will be undercut by the huge
public hope for treatments and cures.
Interestingly though, there may be another nascent federal
bioethics program, in the ethical, legal, and social implications
of
nanotechnology,
irresistibly
named
“nanoethics.”
Nanotechnology does not have the kind of concrete big science
project that ELSI had, but it has had substantial federal
funding, amounting now to about $1 billion each year.
According to an October 2005 article in the Chronicle of Higher
Education,72 the National Science Foundation (NSF) awarded
twenty-one large grants between 2000 and 2005 to research

72. See Jeffrey Brainard, National Science Foundation Promotes Research
on Impact of Nanotechnology, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 21, 2005, at A27.
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nanotechnology. Each of those grants was required to devote
some attention to the social consequences of the technology,
although those efforts were limited. Between 1997 and 2004,
the NSF division of social and behavioral sciences also awarded
grants directly for nanoethics, but they totaled about $10
million.
In October 2005, the NSF awarded four more
nanoethics grants, the two largest of which involved $6.2
million to Arizona State University and $5 million to the
University of California-Santa Barbara; in each case, the funds
are allocated over five years, so the average annual spending
for all four grants is probably around $4 million.73
Nanoethics is, if not big science, at least a well-funded and
new scientific field. It also has some public and political
pressure, based on concerns about environmental risks (the
gray goo,74 among others) and threats to privacy. It will be
interesting to see how it develops.
Neuroethics cannot follow the funding path of ELSI, nor
could it follow the path of nanoethics if that field succeeds in
obtaining substantial federal funding. Where should the field
look for funding for conferences, books, research, fellowships,
salary support, and the other monetarily demanding aspects of
modern research? (Salary support is particularly important to
researchers with positions in medical schools, the homes of
many bioethics centers, as their salaries are often contingent
on grant support.)
Some federal support should be sought. Squeezing new
funding from the NIH may be akin to squeezing blood from a
turnip in its current budget situation, but the neuroscience
funding institutes might be lobbied to set aside a small amount
of their research funding for neuroethics. Even 0.1% across the
three institutes would be about $3 million each year, which
could be allocated through a grant application process. The
social and behavioral sciences division of NSF may be another
useful, if small, source.
But neuroethics will have to look beyond the federal
73. See id. The estimate of annual spending is mine. A recent article on
the Bioethics Blog states, based on a slide shown at a presentation, that the
federal government is spending $42.6 million per year on nanoethics, although
it adds parenthetically that “I am now told that much of this is for ‘education.’”
McGee, supra note 12. That number seems implausibly high.
74. “Gray goo” is the term used to describe an apocalyptic scenario where
uncontrollable and self-replicating nanomachines wipe out life on Earth. The
term, and probably the concept, originated in ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF
CREATION (1986).
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government, probably to foundation support. Thus far, the
Dana Foundation has been the major funding source for
neuroethics research, as it has supported several major
conferences or workshops along with several books and other
publications. Broader financial support needs to be sought
from foundations, including large foundations that are not
focused on the brain.
Foundation funding also has the
advantage that it may be free of some explicit or implicit
strings attached to federal funding.
Between federal funds, foundation funds, and researchers
who are self-funded—whose research is inexpensive and whose
salaries are covered by so-called “hard money”—neuroethics
may be able to survive, and even thrive, financially, but it
seems unlikely that funding will ever come close to the levels
provided by ELSI.
Fortunately, it will not need to because of at least three
ways in which neuroethics benefits from ELSI’s legacy. First,
ELSI has produced a cadre of legal, ethical, and social science
researchers interested in and capable of doing research on the
social implications of biological technologies. ELSI’s money
drew them into the general area and trained them as
practitioners; neuroethics can live to a large extent off that
inheritance. Second, ELSI has provided the financial support
necessary for the increased size and numbers of bioethics
centers. ELSI grants help pay the overhead and provide a
critical mass of colleagues. Centers with grants under the
Centers of Excellence in Ethics of Research program have the
security of several years of reliable funding, not dependent on
individual researchers’ success in grant applications. And
third, ELSI has expanded the market for bioethics.
Journalists, government officials, and even the public have
become accustomed to the word “bioethicist.” Books and
articles by bioethicists and about bioethics are in greater
demand. And universities, think tanks, and other possible
employers value bioethics more highly because of ELSI.
Neuroethics will surely benefit from all of these legacies of
ELSI.
CONCLUSION
“It is always hard to predict things, especially the future.”75
75. This line is usually attributed to the Danish physicist Nils Bohr, but
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Neuroethics is a child, or at least a stepchild, of ELSI. As
geneticists and neuroscientists—and all parents—know,
children are both like and unlike their parents. I have tried to
predict some of the ways in which neuroethics will develop, but
I do so with sincere humility. I know I will be wrong in many
of my predictions; I just don’t know which ones.
One
prediction, though, I put forward with great confidence. Like
ELSI before it, neuroethics will discuss fascinating and
important issues . . . and those people fortunate enough to be
involved in it should have a lot of fun.

tracking it down turns out to be quite difficult. In an earlier article, I wrote:
I had initially thought that this was a quotation from Lawrence Peter
("Yogi") Berra. On examining a book of his quotations, this appears to
be, as he would put it, "one of those things I said that I never said."
YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK OR I REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERYTHING I
SAID (1998). Data base search of news articles over the past 25 years
reveals this quotation, or slightly variant forms of it, attributed most
often to Berra, but also to Casey Stengel, Mark Twain, and even
Confucius. It is most credibly attributed to the Danish physicist, Nils
Bohr, in several news articles quoting other physicists. Erika Wayne,
one of Stanford's excellent research librarians, did find the following
version attributed to Bohr: "It is very difficult to make an accurate
prediction, especially about the future." The quotation was used as
one of several epigrams in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORALITY: ON LAW, ETHICS, AND GOVERNMENT viii (1992), but
without any citation. A concerted search has been unable to find any
good source for the quotation, in spite of all the resources of the
Internet.
Henry T. Greely, Trusted Systems and Medical Records: Lowering
Expectations, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 1585, 1591-92 n.9 (2000).

